In this paper, optimal management of the lake model and commonproperty outcomes are reconsidered when the lake model is extended with a slowly changing variable (describing sedimentation and recycling of phosphorus), which is considered …xed in the simpli…ed version that has been used in the literature up to now. Some intuitive results are recon…rmed but new optimal trajectories are found that were hidden in the simpli…ed analysis. Moreover, it is shown that in the case of common-property, two Nash equilibria exist in a certain area of initial conditions but the one leading to the steady state with a high level of ecological services dominates the other one. However, for an adjacent area of initial conditions, only the Nash equilibrium steady state with a low level of ecological services exists.
Introduction
Resources that are embedded in ecological systems often have characteristics that complicate management. A famous example is the lake system that may have multiple equilibria for certain phosphorus loadings due to non-linear feedbacks in the eutrophication process in the lake Cottingham, 1997, Sche¤er, 1997) . Gradually increasing the release of phosphorus on the lake may lead to a tipping point where the lake system ‡ips from an oligotrophic state, with a high level of ecological services, to a eutrophic state, with a low level of services. These services include, for example, water, …sh and several amenities. After a ‡ip it may be costly (a hysteresis e¤ect) or even impossible to restore the oligotrophic conditions.
Many other systems such as coral reefs, grasslands and climate have similar characteristics.
The release of phosphorus on the lake is a decision variable and a dynamic trade-o¤ has to be made between the agricultural bene…ts that are connected to the release of phosphorus and the loss of ecological services that are due to the accumulation of phosphorus in the water of the lake Starrett, 2003, Mäler et al., 2003) . Optimal management of this ecological system may have multiple steady states, that are comparable to the multiple equilibria for …xed loadings above. This may lead to history dependence in the sense that a so-called Skiba point or indi¤erence point exists that divides the initial conditions of the lake into an area from where the optimal trajectory converges to an oligotrophic steady state and an area from where this trajectory converges to a eutrophic steady state.
Many other papers have been written on optimal management of the lake The dynamics in the sediment of the lake are found to be much slower than the dynamics in the water of the lake (Janssen and Carpenter, 1999) , so that this system has fast-slow dynamics. 2 The one-dimensional lake management models consider the stock of phosphorus in the sediment as …xed and thus the maximum rate of the non-linear feedbacks into the water as a parameter, and in this way ignore the slow dynamics in the lake. In this paper we will analyze optimal management of the full lake system, with fast-slow dynamics, in which this parameter becomes a slowly changing variable. We will show what the longrun e¤ects are but we will also show that a di¤erent type of Skiba point may arise. Such a Skiba point does not indicate indi¤erence between moving to one or the other steady state, as in the one-dimensional representation of the lake, but indicates indi¤erence between one or the other optimal trajectory towards the same long-run steady state. It may happen in such a case, for example, that the optimal trajectory can either move into the oligotrophic area of the lake immediately or can move into the eutrophic area …rst and ‡ip to the oligotrophic area later, with the same total discounted net bene…ts.
In this paper we will show what will happen for di¤erent values of the parameter that weighs the bene…ts and the costs, and for di¤erent initial values of the stocks of phosphorus in the water and in the sediment of the lake. For a high weight on the loss of ecological services, there is one long-run steady state in the oligotrophic area of the lake but a Skiba manifold of initial points appears from which there are di¤erent options for the optimal trajectory towards the steady state. Similarly, for a low weight on the loss of ecological services, there is also one long-run steady state but in the eutrophic area of the lake, with a Skiba manifold of initial points from which there are di¤erent options for the optimal trajectory towards the steady state. For intermediate values of the parameter that weighs the bene…ts and the costs, two stable steady states appear with a Skiba manifold that separates the domains of attraction, but possibly also with a Skiba manifold with di¤erent options for optimal trajectories towards the same steady state.
Resources embedded in ecological systems are usually common-pool re-
sources. An important result in the literature on the management of the one-dimensional lake model is that, even if full cooperation would move the lake towards an oligotrophic state, the lake can be trapped in the eutrophic area in the case of more users when initial conditions are above a certain critical point (Mäler et al., 2003) . In that analysis, the non-cooperative equilibrium between multiple users of the lake is characterized by the symmetric open-loop Nash equilibrium of this di¤erential game (Başar and Olsder, 1982) . We extend this analysis to the full lake system. Full cooperation coincides with optimal management. Furthermore, the trajectories of the open-loop Nash equilibrium can be found by solving the optimal management problem in which the parameter that weighs the bene…ts and the costs is divided by the number of users. We can now interpret one of the results above in a di¤erent way. Since a large number of users corresponds to a low value of the parameter in the optimal management problem, it follows that for su¢ ciently many users the lake will always become eutrophic, regardless of the initial conditions. For a lower number of users, whether the lake will end up in an oligotrophic or a eutrophic state depends again on the initial conditions. However, in this case, an area of initial points exists with two possible Nash equilibria, one resulting in an oligotrophic lake and the other one resulting in a eutrophic lake. We show that the …rst one yields higher net bene…ts so that it may be argued that the users of the lake will coordinate on this Nash equilibrium, if possible. This also implies that there are no Skiba points in the sense of points of indi¤erence between moving to the oligotrophic or the eutrophic area. However, other switch points arise: moving beyond the upper edge of this area of initial points, the users of the lake have to switch to the Nash equilibrium, resulting in the eutrophic state. This is because the other Nash equilibrium does not exist anymore, in the sense of not being reachable from these initial points. This leads to a substantial drop in welfare. Therefore, this set of initial points can be viewed as a pollution trap, since the users of the lake are trapped in a eutrophic area with a substantial drop in welfare.
This paper also assesses the costs of ignoring the slow dynamics. If the slow variable is considered to be constant, the optimal management strategies can be calculated with the one-dimensional lake system, as in the previous literature. If these strategies are used in a simulation of the twodimensional lake system, the discounted net bene…ts can be calculated for the case the slow dynamics are ignored. By comparing this value with the discounted net bene…ts that result from analyzing the full lake system, the costs of ignoring the slow dynamics are found. We will show that these costs are small. The reason is that the stock of phosphorus in the water does not change much anymore on the slow part of the optimal trajectory so that the net bene…ts are not strongly a¤ected either. 
The Lake Model
The lake model as described by Carpenter (2005) is a system of di¤erential equations for phosphorus density in soil, lake water (denoted by P ) and surface sediment (denoted by M for mud). The phosphorus in soil generates run-o¤ into the lake water (denoted by L for loading). The phosphorus densities in the water and the sediment of the lake interact according to the 5 system of di¤erential equations that is given by:
The parameter s denotes the sedimentation rate, h the rate of out ‡ow from the lake system, and b the permanent burial rate. The non-linear term in bene…ts from agricultural production and bene…ts from the ecosystem services generated by the lake system. Community i, by being able to release phosphorous L i (t) at time t on the lake, receives agricultural bene…ts equal to ln L i (t). Phosphorous in the lake water P (t) at time t decreases the ‡ow of services generated by the lake ecosystem by cP (t) 2 . Thus the net ‡ow of bene…ts accruing to community i is ln L i (t) cP (t) 2 . The parameter c 6 indicates the relative importance of the costs versus the bene…ts. First we will consider the optimal management problem for a single user of the lake, because this forms the basis for all other outcomes. This problem can be written as:
subject to (1) and (2).
The traditional analysis of the lake management problem corresponds to the study of only the fast sub-model or:
subject to
Thus, in the traditional analysis of lake management slow dynamics are ignored and the amount of phosphorous in the sediment is assumed to be a …xed parameter at a level M 0 ; so that equation (2) e¤ectively drops out.
By setting x = P=m, a = L=rM 0 andb = (s + h) m=rM 0 , and by changing the time scale to (rM 0 t) =m, equation (6) can be rewritten as
(with q = 2) which is the basic equation describing the lake dynamics in the traditional analysis of lake management. Note that the change in the time scale implies that the discount rate is changed to 3 Optimal Management, Full Cooperation and Open-
Loop Nash Equilibria
The optimal management problem for a single user of the lake, that was de…ned in the previous section, has the current-value Hamiltonian function:
The necessary conditions resulting from the application of the maximum principle determine the optimal phosphorous loading, L (t) ; for interior solutions by:
Using (9
we obtain the modi…ed Hamiltonian system as:
For n communities with the net bene…t functions ln L i (t) cP (t) 2 ; i = 1; 2; :::; n, as described in the previous section, we can distinguish full cooperation and a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. When using the maximum principle, we …nd the so-called open-loop Nash equilibrium (Başar and Olsder, 1982 ).
In case of full cooperation the lake problem becomes:
; subject to (1) and (2) ( 19) Note that symmetry and the logarithmic form in the objective function e¤ectively imply that the full-cooperative solution is independent of the number of communities n, because the problem can be restated as:
ln n i dt ; subject to (1) and (2) (20)
denotes the total loading of phosphorous. From this it can be seen that the solution for P , M and for total loading L is the same as for optimal management above, with total loading L as the control variable. It follows that the modi…ed Hamiltonian system under full cooperation is given by (15)-(18) and does not depend on n. However, the resulting total welfare level (20), of course, depends on n.
The open-loop Nash equilibrium is the solution, derived with the maximum principle, of the set of optimal control problems:
dt ; i = 1; 2; :::; n; subject to (1) and (2) (21)
We will focus on the symmetric open-loop Nash equilibrium. Each community i maximizes (21) by taking the loadings of all other communities j 6 = i as given. The current-value Hamiltonian function for community i becomes:
mum principle for the symmetric equilibrium determine phosphorous loading, L i (t) ; for interior solutions by:
; for all i (24)
_ L, and setting
n ,we obtain the modi…ed Hamiltonian system as:
which is exactly the same system as (15)- (18), except for the term 2cP=n in (27). It follows that the set of possible trajectories of the symmetric openloop Nash equilibrium can be found by solving the modi…ed Hamiltonian system of the optimal management problem with relative cost parameter c=n instead of c. Note, however, that these are only necessary conditions and that the individual welfare indicators (21) are di¤erent. This implies that the Nash equilibrium trajectories for some c and n may di¤er from the optimal trajectories for c=n. Moreover, multiple Nash equilibria may exist.
This will become clear in Section 5.
Summarizing, we can study the management of the lake by studying the modi…ed Hamiltonian system (15)- (18) and by varying the cost parameter c that re ‡ects the relative importance of the costs versus the bene…ts. We can vary c, but we can also …x c at some value and then divide c by the number of communities n in order to move from the optimal management or full-cooperative outcome to the symmetric open-loop Nash equilibrium. By implementing optimality or the Nash equilibrium conditions we can identify the optimal and Nash equilibrium trajectories.
We can compare the results with the results for the one-dimensional representation of the lake system by taking c = 1=m 2 = 0:1736. This cor- Nash equilibrium they …nd two saddle-point stable steady states, one in the oligotrophic area and one in the eutrophic area of the lake, and an unstable steady state in between. More speci…cally, using the one-dimensional representation of the lake, with a …xed parameter M 0 , the steady states are given by the solutions to the set of equations: there is …rst a relatively fast adjustment of P , followed by a slow adjustment of M and P towards the branches of the two optimal trajectories just described. Finally, starting at the end of the black Skiba manifold, in P to approximately the oligotrophic steady-state value of P in the onedimensional analysis of the lake, followed by a slow adjustment of M upwards and P downwards (along the optimal isocline _ P = 0). Starting in (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (5:5; 179), there is …rst a relatively fast adjustment of P to approximately the eutrophic steady-state value of P in the one-dimensional analysis of the lake, followed by a slow adjustment of M and P downwards (along the optimal isocline _ P = 0). Furthermore, starting in either one of the diamonds on the Skiba manifold, there are two optimal trajectories, one towards the oligotrophic long-run steady state and one towards the eutrophic long-run steady state, with the same total discounted net bene…ts. of Skiba manifold appears (the grey curve in Figure 4 ). These are points from where two equivalent optimal trajectories originate that converge to the same oligotrophic steady state. This leads to the situation depicted in with only the Skiba manifold that is separating the domains of attraction.
Starting in (P
As we have seen, this Skiba manifold now bends to the left below, so that all the optimal trajectories for low initial values M 0 converge to the eutrophic steady state. When we gradually decrease the value of the relative cost parameter c from c 2 = 0:0868 to c 3 = 0:057867, at some point the long-run equilibrium in the oligotrophic area of the lake disappears and the outcome becomes as depicted in Figure 3 .
Results for Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
It was shown in Section 3 that for the relative cost parameter c = 0:1736 and the number of communities n = 2 we get the same modi…ed Hamil- [Insert Figure 5 here] Figure 5 presents the projection of the Nash equilibrium trajectories on the (P; M )-plane for the phosphorus densities in the lake water P and in the surface sediment M , starting in initial conditions on a line connecting the two long-run steady states. On the upper part of that line, only one Nash equilibrium exists, leading to the oligotrophic long-run steady-state (the dashed blue lines). On the lower part of that line, also only one Nash equilibrium exists, leading to the eutrophic long-run steady-state (the solid blue lines). However, in the middle part of that line, two Nash equilibria exist, one leading to the oligotrophic steady state and one leading to the eutrophic steady state. The patterns are the same as for the optimal trajectories in Section 4: …rst a fast adjustment of P , followed by a slow adjustment of M and P .
[Insert Figure 6 here] Figure 6 is similar to Figure 5 but now for initial conditions with a …xed M 0 = 179. The initial points with two Nash equilibria in both Figure 5 and Figure 6 do not have to be Skiba indi¤erence points. Although we focus on symmetric Nash equilibria, so that the welfare levels for the two communities are the same in each Nash equilibrium, these welfare levels may be di¤erent when we compare the two Nash equilibria.
[Insert Figure 7 here] Figure 7 depicts the resulting discounted net bene…ts (21) for the Nash equilibrium trajectories in Figure 6 as a function of the initial condition P 0 .
It shows that when two Nash equilibria exist, the one leading to the oligotrophic steady state has higher welfare everywhere. We may argue that the two communities will try to coordinate on the best Nash equilibrium but then an interesting phenomenon occurs. When we increase the initial condition P 0 beyond the point where two Nash equilibria still exist, the communities cannot coordinate on this best Nash equilibrium anymore, because it does not exist anymore. They have to switch to the bad Nash equilibrium, leading to the eutrophic long-run steady state. The drop in welfare at this point is considerable (from 57:06 to 73:32). This point can be viewed as the beginning of a pollution trap. Moving beyond this point implies that the good Nash equilibrium is not reachable any more and that the lake will end up in a eutrophic state with a considerable drop in welfare. This is because, due to open-loop strategies, users commit to their optimal path given the speci…c initial condition. If the initial condition is such that the oligotrophic steady state is not reachable, then users are committed to a path that traps them into the eutrophic region with a considerable drop in welfare.
Welfare Loss Ignoring Slow Dynamics
In this section we return to optimal management but now we consider what happens if the slow dynamics of the phosphorus accumulation in the surface sediment M is ignored. This means that we implement the optimal loading that is found with the one-dimensional representation of the lake into the two-dimensional lake system, and compare the result with the optimal management of the two-dimensional lake system. Figure 1 presents the optimal management of the two-dimensional lake system for relative cost parameter c 1 = 0:1736. As we have seen, for the initial conditions (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (0; 179) or (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (5:5; 179) there is …rst a relatively fast adjustment of P , followed by a slow adjustment of M upwards and P downwards (along the optimal isocline _ P = 0). If we now implement the optimal loading that is found with the one-dimensional representation of the lake into the two-dimensional lake system, we get Figure 8 .
[Insert Figure 8 here] Figure 8 shows that ignoring the slow dynamics in M leads to a cyclical pattern in P and M . Instead of converging to the long-run steady state (P C 1 ; M C 1 ) = (0:77420; 194:19) as in Figure 1 , P starts cycling at some point in time between about 0:7 and 2:25 and M starts cycling between about 170 and 181:5. This is not optimal, of course, but it also not dramatic.
Starting in (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (0; 179), the optimal welfare is equal to 26:62 and the welfare ignoring the slow dynamics in M is equal to 26:68. Starting in (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (5:5; 179), the optimal welfare is equal to 49:49 and the welfare ignoring the slow dynamics in M is equal to 49:52. The reason why the welfare loss is small is that the fast adjustment in P already moves the lake into the oligotrophic area, close to the optimal long-run steady state, before the changes in M start to have an e¤ect. Ignoring the slow dynamics in M will not yield convergence to the optimal point but it will not switch the lake to the eutrophic area either. Figure 2 presents the optimal management of the two-dimensional lake system for relative cost parameter c 2 = 0:0868. As we have seen, in this case there are two optimal long-run steady states, (P C 21 ; M C 21 ) = (0:87017; 189:90) and (P C 22 ; M C 22 ) = (3:3551; 173:09), one in the oligotrophic area and one in the eutrophic area of the lake, with a Skiba manifold separating the domains of attraction. For initial condition (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (0; 179) there is …rst a relatively fast adjustment of P , followed by a slow adjustment of M upwards and P downwards (along the optimal isocline _ P = 0), and for initial condition (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (5:5; 179) there is …rst a relatively fast adjustment of P , followed by a slow adjustment of M and P downwards (along the optimal isocline _ P = 0). Furthermore, starting in the lower diamond on the Skiba manifold, there are two optimal trajectories, one towards the oligotrophic long-run steady state and one towards the eutrophic long-run steady state, with the same total discounted net bene…ts. If we now implement the optimal loading that is found with the one-dimensional representation of the lake into the two-dimensional lake system, we get Figure 9 .
[Insert Figure 9 ] Figure 9 shows that ignoring the slow dynamics in M leads to a cyclical pattern in P and M in the oligotrophic area of the lake, but it leads to convergence in the eutrophic area of the lake. Note that the diamond is not a Skiba point anymore, because now we are not implementing the optimal loading for the two-dimensional lake system. In the oligotrophic area, instead of converging to the long-run steady state (P C 11 ; M C 11 ) as in Figure 2 , P starts cycling at some point in time between about 0:75 and 2:25 and M starts cycling between about 170 and 180:5. Starting in (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (0; 179), the optimal welfare is equal to 25:13 and the welfare ignoring the slow dynamics in M is equal to 25:23. In the eutrophic area, instead of converging to the long-run steady state (P C 22 ; M C 22 ) as in Figure 2 , the lake system will now converge to the long-run steady state (P; M ) = (4:0744; 188:81). Starting in (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (5:5; 179), the optimal welfare is equal to 37:35 and the welfare ignoring the slow dynamics in M is equal to 37:73. This welfare loss is a bit higher than in the previous cases because the trajectory di¤ers more from the optimal trajectory, but the welfare loss remains to be small because the trajectory remains in the eutrophic area. Ignoring the slow dynamics in M does not lead to a large loss in welfare in this case either. Figure 3 presents the optimal management of the two-dimensional lake system for relative cost parameter c 3 = 0:057867. As we have seen, for the initial conditions (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (0; 179) or (P 0 ; M 0 ) = (5:5; 179) there is …rst a relatively fast adjustment of P , followed by a slow adjustment of M upwards and P upwards (along the optimal isocline _ P = 0). If we now implement the optimal loading that is found with the one-dimensional representation of the lake into the two-dimensional lake system, we get Figure 10 .
[Insert Figure 10 here] Figure 10 shows that ignoring the slow dynamics in M leads to convergence again but towards a di¤erent long-run steady state. Instead of converging to the long-run steady state (P C 3 ; M C 3 ) = (4:7957; 207:29) as in Figure 3 , the lake system will now converge to the long-run steady state Summarizing, even though the one-dimensional representation of the lake ignores the slow dynamics in the phosphorus accumulation in the surface sediment of the lake, optimal management with this simpli…ed model does not perform so badly. Implementing the one-dimensional optimal loading of phosphorus into the full lake system and comparing the resulting welfare with the optimal welfare shows that the welfare loss is small. The reason is in fact the slow dynamics. Optimal management of the simpli…ed model already makes the choice to move the lake either into the oligotrophic or into the eutrophic area. Further adjustments that are needed for optimal management of the full lake system prove to be relatively unimportant.
Conclusion
The lake is a ecological system providing services that can be damaged by phosphorus loadings resulting from pro…table human activities. This paper considers optimal management and Nash equilibria in the analysis of the full lake model and compares the results with the previous literature that has focused on a simpli…ed version of the model. The full model includes, besides the damaging accumulation of phosphorus in the water, the slow accumulation of phosphorus in the surface sediment describing the process of sedimentation of phosphorus and recycling back into the water.
The main pattern of the results stays intact. If a high value is attached to the ecological services as compared to the other pro…table activities, optimal management will move the lake towards an oligotrophic state with a high level of ecological services. If a low value is attached to the ecological services, optimal management will move the lake towards a eutrophic state with a low level of ecological services. For intermediate values, Skiba indi¤erence points exist with optimal trajectories to either an oligotrophic or a eutrophic state. However, optimal management of the more complicated two-dimensional non-linear system gives rise to another type of Skiba points.
Starting in these points, di¤erent optimal trajectories can be chosen, leading to the same long-run steady state, with the same level of welfare. Typically, these trajectories either move to the targeted area of the lake directly or move to the other area …rst and stay there for some time, before moving to the targeted area.
Another interesting result was found in case of common property, with a number of communities who are damaging the lake but also using the common ecological services. Non-cooperative behavior is characterized with an open-loop Nash equilibrium of this di¤erential game. An area of initial points exist with two possible Nash equilibria, one leading to an oligotrophic steady state and the other one leading to a eutrophic steady state. However, these initial points are not Skiba points because the welfare levels are di¤erent in the two Nash equilibria. In fact, the Nash equilibrium moving towards the oligotrophic state always dominates the Nash equilibrium moving towards the eutrophic state. It can be argued that the communities will coordinate on the good Nash equilibrium, but then a potential pollution trap exists where the communities have to switch to the bad Nash equilibrium.
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The good one does not exist anymore in the sense that it is not reachable from the speci…c set of initial conditions. Being in the pollution trap implies a substantial drop in welfare.
An important question is how much welfare is lost when the optimal phosphorus loadings found with the simpli…ed version of the lake model are implemented in the more complicated version. It is shown that optimal convergence of the trajectories may turn into cyclical behavior or into convergence towards a di¤erent long-run steady state, but the welfare losses are small. The reason is that the process of sedimentation and recycling back into the water is slow as compared to the phosphorus accumulation in the water. Therefore, optimal management ignoring the slow process will already move the lake into the right area. The adjustments that are needed for optimality when the slow changes kick in will not a¤ect welfare very much. In the case of the lake, simpli…ed optimal management will not perform very badly.
The lake model is a metaphor for many of the environmental problems facing the world today. This paper provides insights and analytical tools for developing optimal management of the lake and characterizing commonproperty outcomes. These systems are complicated because they are nonlinear and because some parameters are slowly changing. This paper shows how these systems can be analyzed and managed properly.
Appendix
For b = 0 the steady state of the system (1)-(3) is given by:
The JacobianĴ becomes:
so that the determinant is given by: detĴ = hrf (P ) = hr 1 +m q ;m = 
